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Savings Arrangements
Objective: This study examines fairness per-
ceptions of experimentally manipulated savings
arrangements in couples (i.e., distribution of
control and ownership of savings) to identify dis-
tributive justice principles in marriage.
Background: Theoretically, competing norms
about individual ownership rights and autonomy
(equity principle) and marital sharing (equal-
ity principle) in interaction with gender ideology
(entitlement principle) may explain how individ-
uals perceive the fairness of different savings
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arrangements, but these explanations have not
been tested against each other yet.
Method: In a nationally representative factorial
survey experiment, implemented in the German
GESIS Panel, 3,948 respondents evaluated the
fairness of randomly presented savings arrange-
ments (N = 19,648 evaluations).
Results: Respondents rated equal control as
more important than equal ownership to estab-
lish fairness in marriage. The ownership of sav-
ings does not seem to be directly linked to con-
trol, providing evidence against the equity prin-
ciple. Inequality in ownership is rated fairer if it
is in favor of the husband, whereas inequality in
control is rated fairer if it is in favor of the wife.
This suggests that gender is an ascriptive char-
acteristic according to which resources should
be allocated (entitlement principle).
Conclusion: The results indicate that the ideal
of marital sharing is widespread, but is rather
accomplished by equal control than by equal
ownership. Individuals’ fairness perceptions of
inequality in marriage are gendered, that is,
depend on whom inequality favors.
How valued resources should be distributed
is a major question in society in general, but
also in the private sphere including marriage.
Distributive justice principles morally guide
individuals on how to distribute resources.
Little is known about which justice principles
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individuals apply within marriage. Generally
following Deutsch (1975), the equity principle
(i.e., allocating rewards proportional to inputs)
is dominantly applied to enhance productivity,
whereas the equality principle (i.e., allocating
rewards equally neglecting inputs) is domi-
nantly applied to foster enjoyable relationships
and promote harmony. Within marriage, the
entitlement principle (i.e., allocating rewards
according to gender) may also be an important
justice principle (Hülle, Liebig, & May, 2018).
For example, individuals may believe in men’s
greater financial competence and therefore think
that it is fair if husbands have the last word in
major financial decisions.
Prior research in this area has primarily
focused on couples’ outcomes of distributive
justice processes by studying financial arrange-
ments and the treatment of income in marriage
(for a review, see Bennett, 2013). However,
studying behavior can only partially explain
which justice principles spouses apply in mar-
riage (Pepin, 2019). For example, observed
financial arrangements do not necessarily reveal
intentions to share resources (Burgoyne & Son-
nenberg, 2009). Having a joint bank account
may not indicate that couples apply the equality
principle as individual access to the account
might be unequal following the equity principle
(Elizabeth, 2001). Further, financial arrange-
ments do not always reflect both spouses’
norms and attitudes. On the one hand, financial
arrangements may not be explicitly negotiated
and rather evolve unconsciously for practical
reasons and convenience (Addo, 2017). On the
other hand, if spouses’ norms conflict, the spouse
with more financial resources may enforce her
or his preferred financial arrangement (Blood &
Wolfe, 1960).
In this study we experimentally examine if
individuals apply the equality, the equity, or the
entitlement principle when rating the fairness
of different savings arrangement of fictitious
couples. Here, savings arrangements refer to the
distribution of control (i.e., who has the final say
in important financial decisions) and ownership
(i.e., in which name savings are held) of mone-
tary savings between spouses. Revealing justice
principles in marriage helps examining the
subjective relevance of within-couple inequal-
ities in savings. In addition, we can answer
the question if individuals would feel fairly
treated under different saving arrangements,
which is essential for spouses’ well-being
and the stability of marriage (Burgoyne &
Lewis, 1994).
We focus on savings as an important compo-
nent of wealth. Whereas earnings are flows of
money, which can be clearly ascribed to each
spouse, wealth is a stock of assets, where sources
are more diffuse. Therefore, distributing con-
trol and ownership of wealth likely involves
more ambiguous fairness considerations than
distributing income.
By studying savings, we can address
an empirical puzzle regarding substantial
within-couple wealth inequalities in Germany.
Whereas the formal ownership of wealth is
unequally distributed, informal control of
finances is more equally distributed between
opposite-sex partners in Germany. For instance,
women own about €33,000 less personal wealth
than men in married and cohabiting couples
(Grabka, Marcus, & Sierminska, 2015). How-
ever, in over 80% of the couples, respondents
indicate that the partners share the last word in
important financial decisions (Lott, 2009). This
discrepancy may be explained by individuals
prioritizing equal control over equal ownership.
Our study contributes in several ways to the
literatures on distributive justice and on money
in marriage. The overarching aim of this study
is to identify distributive justice principles in
marriage. First, we aim to address the question
whether equality or equity is the dominant jus-
tice principle in marriage. Prior research showed
experimental evidence that individuals apply
both the equity and the equality principle when
evaluating the fairness of housework and income
allocations within couples (Auspurg, Iacovou,
& Nicoletti, 2017; Burgoyne & Routh, 2001;
Pepin, 2019). We test if individuals apply those
two principles also when distributing the control
and ownership of savings and ask if equity and
equality are two equally relevant justice princi-
ples in marriage. Further, as prior research found
mixed results regarding the question if men are
more likely to apply the equity and women the
equality principle (Auspurg et al., 2017; Bur-
goyne & Lewis, 1994), we exploratively exam-
ine differences in justice evaluations of male and
female respondents.
Second, by considering entitlement as an
additional justice principle and by testing if
gender is a characteristic according to which
resources should be distributed, we aim to con-
tribute to the literature on gendered money in
couples (Bennett, 2013). Prior research showed
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that gendered inequalities in power over money
within couples exist (Vogler & Pahl, 1994).
Whereas wives have been more likely to man-
age money, that is, organize money and make
ends meet, husbands have been more likely to
control money, that is, make major financial
decisions (Vogler, Lyonette, & Wiggins, 2008).
However, the reasons why wives have less
power over money than husbands have yet to
be investigated in detail. We contribute to this
literature by asking if individuals perceive the
fairness of inequalities in control and owner-
ship in favor of the husband differently than
inequalities in favor of the wife.
Last, we aim to respond to the question of how
couples reconcile the competing norms of auton-
omy and sharing in marriage (Bennett, 2013).
For example, whereas the norm of autonomy
may be fulfilled by having separate savings
accounts, the norm of sharing may be met by
having an equal say in major financial deci-
sions. Prior experimental research showed that
equality is an important ideal in marriage (Bur-
goyne & Routh, 2001; Pepin, 2019). However,
little is known about how individuals would
like to establish equality and what marital shar-
ing comprises (Elizabeth, 2001). Equality can be
established by pooling financial resources, but
also by sharing control over financial resources.
We test if sharing control is more important
for fairness than sharing ownership. Further, we
quantitatively examine if having separate sav-
ings accounts but equal control could be one
option to reconcile autonomy and sharing.
We use data from a factorial survey experi-
ment, which was implemented for this study in
a nationally representative panel survey in Ger-
many (GESIS Panel, https://doi.org/10.4232/1
.13245). Each respondent received five different
vignettes, which are descriptions of fictitious
situations of a couple, and respondents were
asked to evaluate the fairness of the described
situations. The vignettes varied in the degrees of
inequality in control and ownership of savings.
We can clearly identify how single character-
istics of a hypothetical couple affect fairness
evaluations because these characteristics are
randomly presented to respondents. This can be
achieved by comparing the fairness evaluations
of different vignettes, which include different
combinations of couple’s characteristics. The
main advantage of the factorial survey approach
is to overcome the empirical confoundedness
of ownership and control over savings with
different individual characteristics such as
gender, which is the central limitation of prior
observational studies.
Background
Early qualitative literature on money in marriage
focused on establishing a typology to categorize
couples’ financial management and control, dif-
ferentiating between the whole wage, allowance,
shared management, and independent man-
agement system (e.g., Pahl, 1983; Vogler &
Pahl, 1994). To operationalize Pahl’s (1983)
typology in quantitative surveys, Pahl (1990)
suggested to use two criteria to create a clas-
sification of couple’s financial arrangements,
namely if the couple pools their money and
who “really” controls the money. On the basis
of these two criteria, Kenney (2006) identified
six systems of financial arrangements: separate
money, women’s control; separate money, men’s
control; separate money, equal control; pooled
money, women’s control; pooled money, men’s
control; and pooled money, equal control.
More recent studies refined and tested these
typologies in different countries and over time,
and tried to find couples’ characteristics which
explain couples’ choices of financial arrange-
ments (e.g., Coelho, 2014; Knudsen & Wær-
ness, 2009; Lott, 2017). This research shows
that the majority of married couples pool their
money but men are more likely than women
to have control over money independent of the
couple’s pooling mode (Kenney, 2006; Lauer
& Yodanis, 2011; Vogler et al., 2008). Further,
when women have the necessary resources they
seem to prefer financial autonomy by separating
income and have the highest probability to have
at least equal control (Kenney, 2006; Lott, 2017;
Vogler et al., 2008). There seems to be a gen-
eral trend toward more separateness in couples’
finances involving the risk that men have control
over more money than their female partner due
to, on average, lower earnings of women (Knud-
sen & Wærness, 2009). However, even if no
money is pooled, personal money might be used
to provide the partner with an economic buffer
and some degree of control might be granted to
the partner (Evertsson & Nyman, 2014).
The starting point of our study are
Pahl’s (1990) two criteria to classify cou-
ple’s financial arrangements, but we focus on
savings instead of income. We label the two
criteria ownership and control. Ownership is
Beliefs about Distributive Justice in Marriage 519
concerned only with the legal ownership of
savings, that is, in whose name savings are held.
Spouses may have separate savings accounts,
joint accounts, or both. Control relates to which
partner has the final say in major financial
decisions (Pahl, 1983). Control has to be distin-
guished from money management, which refers
to organizing money and making ends meet on
a day to day basis (Vogler et al., 2008).
The German Context
The meaning and relevance of inequalities in
ownership and control over savings may depend
on the social context. Because we use represen-
tative data from Germany, we briefly describe
three aspects of the German context which are
most relevant to contextualize ownership and
control over savings. First, private savings are
relatively common in Germany. The average
household saving rate in 2018 was about 11%
in Germany and is among the highest rates
in OECD countries (e.g., 7% in the United
States in 2017) (OECD, 2020). The high saving
rate in Germany is explained with underde-
veloped credit markets and strict mortgage
regulations which necessitate private savings.
In addition, tax incentives and public subsidies
encourage saving (Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, &
Schnabel, 2003).
Second, the default marital property regime
in Germany is separation of property (similar
to most states in the United States) with com-
munity of accrued gains at divorce. In other
words, within marriage both spouses remain
the owners of their complete personal wealth
including wealth that they accumulate during
marriage. Their individual control is only lim-
ited in cases of very significant financial deci-
sions and in cases which pertain to the joint
household, for example, concerning the marital
home. At divorce, the wealth gained during mar-
riage (except for inheritances) is equally divided
between both partners. Spouses can opt out of
this default regime with a marital contract, but it
is unclear how many couples choose alternative
property regimes (Dutta, 2012; Tammen, 2007).
Third, Germany used to be classified as a
strong male breadwinner society with a preva-
lent traditional gender ideology (Cooke &
Baxter, 2010; Treas & Widmer, 2000). In recent
decades, more egalitarian gender ideologies
have spread (Grunow, Begall, & Buchler, 2018).
In addition, welfare reforms such as the parental
leave reform of 2007 with two additional
months of paid leave if each parent takes at least
2 months of leave shifted the gendered division
of labor toward a modified breadwinner model
with 1.5 earners. Still clear gender inequalities in
the labor market persist with women remaining
the main care givers (Trappe, Pollmann-Schult,
& Schmitt, 2015).
To derive our hypotheses about fairness
evaluations of couples’ savings arrangements,
we combine the literature on money in mar-
riage with the literature on distributive justice
in marriage considering the German context.
Distributive justice theory addresses the fairness
in the distribution of goods, such as ownership
and control over savings. We test which justice
principles (equality, equity, and entitlement)
individuals apply when evaluating the fairness
of different saving arrangements.
Equality Principle
Equality refers to allocating resources equally
neglecting inputs (Deutsch, 1975). In many
modern societies, intimate relationships are
perceived as “partnerships between equals,
based on love, sharing and equality, in which
all resources are shared equally, regardless
of who contributes what to the household”
(Vogler, 2005, p. 3). Particularly, this applies
to marriage. In qualitative studies, partici-
pants reveal a rhetoric of sharing and equality,
which shows that the norm of marital sharing
is widespread (e.g., Burgoyne & Lewis, 1994;
Elizabeth, 2001). If individuals have internal-
ized the norm of sharing, they would apply the
equality principle. Because the output of equal-
ity is not tied to any individual inputs, we expect
that both equal ownership and equal control are
rated fairer than unequal ownership and unequal
control. In this study, we define equal ownership
as a couple having a joint savings account,
where both spouses legally own an equal share
of the savings.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Individuals judge situations
fairer in which partners own equal savings (joint
account) compared to unequal savings, adjusted
for control.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Individuals judge situations
fairer if both partners jointly control savings com-
pared to only one partner controlling savings,
adjusted for ownership.
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Prior research showed that individuals apply
the equality principle when allocating money or
housework within couples (Auspurg et al., 2017;
Burgoyne & Routh, 2001; Pepin, 2019). How-
ever, it is unclear what individuals mean by equal
sharing of money (Elizabeth, 2001). If individ-
uals have the equality principle in mind, do
they seek for equality in ownership of money
or for equality in control over finances or both?
To establish equality in marriage, having equal
control over savings might be more important
than having a joint bank account because con-
trol relates more to power than ownership of
joint resources. Even when couples pool their
money or when both partner work, women have
been found to have on average less economic
power than their partners (Kenney, 2006). To
put it differently, “neither mere work in eco-
nomic activities nor even ownership of economic
resources is enough if the person doesn’t con-
trol them” (Blumberg, 1988, p. 54). Whereas a
joint account does not guarantee equal informal
rights to access money and to decide how to
spend it (Burgoyne, 1990), having control over
savings enables partners to enjoy these bene-
fits. For example, a non-working partner might
not feel entitled to spend the savings although
jointly held. Thus, hidden economic inequalities
may arise (Burgoyne, 1990). However, if part-
ners equally control the savings although the
account is held in only one name, both part-
ners may benefit from this account. For example,
a couple may always jointly decide over major
financial issues. Thus, we expect equality of con-
trol to be more important for fairness judgments
than equality of ownership.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The control dimension is more
important for fairness judgments than the owner-
ship dimension.
Within-couple inequality in the ownership
of savings may emerge deliberately or uncon-
sciously, but couples may feel uncomfortable
with unequal ownership in both ways as it
conflicts with the norm of marital sharing.
In contrast, there is a debate on the trend
toward individualization of marriage (Yoda-
nis & Lauer, 2014) and prior experimental
research showed that individuals endorse some
economic autonomy also for married couples
(Pepin, 2019). Thus, modern couples have to
reconcile the tensions between the norm of
marital sharing and the desire for financial
autonomy. In a qualitative study, Evertsson
and Nyman (2014, p. 78) found that “couples
desired equality while attempting to maintain
economic autonomy”. They interviewed cou-
ples, which did not pool their money at all,
and found that although both partners had full
control over their personal money in theory, they
granted some degree of control to their partners.
Thus, one way how couples could reconcile
the competing norms of sharing and autonomy
is to keep separate accounts but share control,
that is, make major decisions together. Spouses
may compensate inequality in the ownership
of savings by sharing control over savings to
establish equality. We therefore expect that
inequality in ownership is rated fairer if control
is equal compared to unequal control.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Unequal ownership is judged
fairer if both partners control the savings than if
only one partner controls the savings.
Equity Principle
Qualitative research showed that although the
norm of marital sharing is widespread and the
interviewed couples often aim to realize the
ideal of equal sharing, in practice this was not
always achieved (Burgoyne & Lewis, 1994).
Instead, perceived ownership of joint money is
often based on partners’ contributions, leading
to (hidden) inequalities in accessing money
(Burgoyne, 1990). In particular, the interplay of
ownership and control may evoke equity con-
siderations. Equity refers to allocating rewards
proportional to inputs of different kind, such
as contributions or efforts (Deutsch, 1975).
Individuals may consider ownership as a valid
input factor for the allocation of control. There-
fore, they may think that owning more savings
should go along with the right to control savings
(Burgoyne & Lewis, 1994). Burgoyne (1990),
for example, found that partners often only feel
entitled to control household money if they
have contributed to it. Therefore, we expect
individuals to apply the equity principle.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Individuals judge situations
fairer in which the partner who owns more savings,
also controls the savings than situations in which
the other partner controls.
As prior research discussed if men are
more likely to apply the equity principle than
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women (Auspurg et al., 2017; Burgoyne &
Lewis, 1994), we exploratively examine if
male respondents are more likely than female
respondents to apply the equity principle.
Entitlement Principle
Traditional gender ideology, that is, individuals’
support for a gendered division of labor, might
affect fairness evaluations of couples’ savings
arrangements via the entitlement principle. This
principle refers to allocating rewards according
to gender or other ascribed status characteris-
tics (Hülle et al., 2018). As mentioned above,
despite a trend toward more egalitarian gen-
der ideologies, a modified breadwinner model
with 1.5 earners persists in large parts of the
German population. Individuals with a rather
traditional gender ideology may believe that
men have a greater financial competence than
women and that it is the role of the husband
to be the main financial provider of the family.
Nyman (2003, p. 92) termed this idea as “men’s
‘natural’ right to money”. The male breadwinner
model implicitly induces the normative expec-
tation that the male partner should have control
over savings as he is responsible for the financial
well-being of the family. In terms of the doing
gender approach (West & Zimmerman, 1987),
men do gender by owning and controlling sav-
ings. Women do gender by managing money and
in particularly making ends meet. In contrast to
control, money management is often perceived
as part of housework (Vogler et al., 2008; Yoda-
nis & Lauer, 2007). This implies that money
and therefore economic inequality is not gen-
der neutral. Therefore, we expect respondents to
believe in men’s entitlement to own and control
savings.
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Unequal ownership is judged
fairer if the husband owns more savings compared
to the wife, adjusted for control.
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Unequal control is judged
fairer if the husband has more control compared
to the wife, adjusted for ownership.
Prior research found mixed evidence for gen-
dered distributive justice in marriage. Gager and
Hohmann-Marriott (2006) found that especially
husbands’ fairness evaluations of housework are
based on the traditional gender-based division of
labor. In contrast, Auspurg et al. (2017) found
little evidence for beliefs that gender is a char-
acteristic according to which housework should
be allocated. Regarding money, Pepin (2019)
showed that respondents in the United States
believe in gendered distributive justice. In her
survey experiment, different vignettes were pre-
sented to respondents describing different hypo-
thetical couples. Each respondent received one
vignette and was asked to allocate the personal
earnings of the couple to individual accounts and
a shared account. Among others, the vignettes
varied in the levels of both partners’ earnings.
In vignettes in which the woman was framed as
the primary earner respondents allocated more
money to her personal account compared to
money on his personal account when the man
was framed as the primary earner.
Method
Data
To test the hypotheses, we use the GESIS
Panel (Version 29.0.0) (Bosnjak et al., 2018),
a bimonthly probability-based mixed-mode
access panel in Germany. That is, the GESIS
Panel is accessible for academic researchers
to field primary studies by passing through a
peer review procedure. The reference popu-
lation for the probability-based sample is the
German-speaking population aged between
18 and 70 years permanently residing in Ger-
many. To ensure representativeness also among
non-Internet users, the GESIS Panel offers two
participation modes. About two third of the
respondents participate online (web-based), one
third participate offline by mail.
Our factorial survey experiment on fairness
perceptions of couples’ savings arrangement
was implemented in Wave fd 2018. Of 3,992,
3,948 respondents of this wave have participated
in the factorial survey experiment. A total of
98% of the 3,948 respondents who started the
factorial survey rated all presented vignettes.
Because each respondent was asked to rate five
vignettes, our analyses are based on 19,648
vignette evaluations, which are our units of
analysis. There are 51% women in our sample.
The average age of respondents is 53 years. We
include both partnered and single respondents
because we are interested in the general pop-
ulation’s beliefs about fairness in couples. A
total of 63% of the respondents are married. For
further details see Table S2.
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Factorial Survey Design
Factorial surveys are used to gain deeper insights
into respondents’ judgment principles by com-
paring the influence of different stimuli on the
outcome of interest. In our factorial survey, each
respondent received five vignettes each describ-
ing a fictitious couple. These vignettes vary ran-
domly on couple’s savings arrangement. It was
the respondents’ task to evaluate the fairness of
the five hypothetical situations. We employed a
3× 3 design, resulting in nine different vignettes.
Thus, we had two dimensions (ownership and
control) with each three levels (inequality in
favor of wife, inequality in favor of husband, and
equality). One of these vignettes is shown here
(varying part in italics):
Imagine a married couple, woman and man, both
at the same age. They have been living together in a
rented flat for 5 years and are childless. Both work
full-time and they share the housework. Both put
some of their monthly incomes aside to save for
major purchases or rainy days.
They have €20.000 on a joint savings account
and no individual savings accounts. Mainly the
woman decides when and for what the whole sav-
ings are spent.
How fair is this situation?
The first part of the vignette describes the
vignette couple. This description stayed con-
stant across the nine vignettes. The description
is important to ensure that respondents think
about the same scenario such that further char-
acteristics, which individuals might associate
with the hypothetical couple (e.g., different work
effort of the spouses), cannot bias the analy-
ses. By stating that both vignette partners work
full-time, share the housework equally, are at
the same age, and are married we hold impor-
tant factors for fairness considerations constant.
That means, we cannot generalize our find-
ings to beliefs about fairness in couples devi-
ating from these characteristics, for example,
cohabiting couples. We deliberately left open
the question of how the inequality in the own-
ership of savings has emerged (e.g., differences
in income, in bequests, or in savings behav-
ior between the spouses). The second part of
the vignette includes the experimental manipu-
lations, which are further explained in the mea-
surement section.
To reduce methodological issues that could
bias our estimates (e.g., order/carryover, learn-
ing, ceiling, and fatigue effects as well as
censoring of responses), we took the following
steps. To avoid fatigue effects we did not present
all nine vignettes to all respondents. Instead,
we built two decks including each five vignettes
with a deliberate blocking technique (%MktEx
Macro in SAS 9.4) to maximize orthogonality
(dimensions do not correlate) and level bal-
ance (each level occurs with equal frequency)
within each deck (Auspurg & Hinz, 2015,
p. 39). Thereby, a most efficient design can be
accomplished.
To control for differences in referent points
between groups we used one anchoring vignette,
that is, each respondent received the same
vignette as the first vignette. Thus, only the
remaining eight vignettes were assigned to
the two decks. The anchoring vignette should
be the baseline category of both dimensions to
ensure statistical independence between vignette
dimensions. We used equality in both dimen-
sions as an anchor because this vignette makes
it easier for respondents to judge the fairness
of more unequal situations. Further, using this
anchor vignette reduces ceiling effects because
we expect respondents to rate this vignette as
the fairest situation. To reduce order effects, we
reversed the order of the four vignettes per deck,
resulting in four experimental groups, each
containing five vignettes (see Table S4). Finally,
respondents could re-evaluate their answers
to reduce ceiling effects. That is, by allowing
re-evaluations we guarantee that the measuring
range was not exceeded and respondents could
rate each vignette in comparison to the other
vignettes. The questionnaire was pretested qual-
itatively (N = 5) and quantitatively (N = 132,
convenience sample).
Factorial surveys are most efficient if the
design is both orthogonal and balanced (Aus-
purg & Hinz, 2015). As we used one anchoring
vignette, we do not have a balanced design.
The equal control and joint ownership levels
are oversampled. However, the two dimensions
are almost orthogonal and are correlated only
marginally (r = 0.05, p< .001, see Table S1).
Most importantly for the vignette experiment
to work, the four different survey versions were
randomly assigned to respondents. There are no
significant correlations between the two dimen-
sions of the vignettes’ and the respondents’
characteristics (see Table S1). Further, each
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Figure 1. Histogram of Vignette Evaluations.
Note. N = 19,648 vignette evaluations in whole sample, N = 17,643 in reduced sample.
Table 1. Vignette Dimensions and Levels
Dimensions Levels
Ownership (1) Joint ownership: They have €20,000 on a joint savings account and no individual savings accounts.
(2) Wife owns more: The wife has got €15,000 on her savings account, the husband has got €5,000 on his
savings account.
(3) Husband owns more: The wife has got €5,000 on her savings account, the husband has got €15.000
on his savings account.
Control (1) Equal control: They both decide equally when and for what the whole savings are spent.
(2) Wife controls: Mainly the woman decides when and for what the whole savings are spent.
(3) Husband controls: Mainly the man decides when and for what the whole savings are spent.
experimental group includes roughly the same
number of respondents (see Table S4).
Measurements
For our analyses we use respondents’ perceived
fairness of the described situation as the depen-
dent variable, which ranges from 0 (very unfair)
to 10 (very fair). Figure 1 shows the histograms
of the dependent variable for the whole sample
and for a reduced sample with level balance.
To generate the reduced sample, we randomly
dropped half of the first vignette evaluations.
Because each respondent first received the
anchoring vignette (joint ownership and equal
control), this vignette is oversampled in the
original sample. The anchor vignette is the
vignette, which is rated on average as the fairest,
explaining the higher percentage of the value 10
(very fair) in the whole sample.
Our predictor variables are ownership and
control, both with three levels. The owner-
ship dimension comprises the levels: (a) joint
ownership, (b) unequal ownership in favor of
the wife, and (c) unequal ownership in favor
of the husband. The control dimension com-
prises the following levels: (a) equal control,
(b) wife mainly controls, and (c) husband
mainly controls (see Table 1). For the control
dimension, we focus on major instead of minor
decision-making because we want respondents
to think about who should control the savings
and not only about who should have access
to savings. In addition, we use the interaction
terms of ownership and control to explain
fairness evaluations. As the respondents were
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Figure 2. Predicted Fairness Evaluations
Note. N = 19,648 vignette evaluations, 95% confidence intervals. Full results in Table 3.
randomly assigned to vignettes, respondents’
characteristics do not have to be included in the
statistical models (Mutz, 2011).
Analytical Approach
We preregistered our hypotheses at the Open
Science Framework (https://osf.io/6ued4). To
test the hypotheses, we estimate ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions. As respondents
evaluated up to five different vignettes and,
thus, the single judgments are the unit of anal-
ysis, we adjust standard errors for clustering
within respondents. We will first show the
results of the regression graphically and then
test the hypotheses with additional F-tests using
predicted margins.
Results
Graphical Presentation of Regression Results
We start with a graphical presentation of the
OLS regression results in Figure 2. Predicted
fairness evaluations are depicted on the y-axis.
The x-axis comprises the ownership dimension
with its three levels. The markers comprise the
control dimension. The circles depict situations
in which the wife controls, the diamonds sit-
uations in which both spouses jointly control,
and the squares situations in which the husband
controls. Respondents rated situations in which
both spouses equally control the savings fairest.
For example, if the wife owns more savings than
the husband and both control equally, respon-
dents rated this situation as 7.08 on a fairness
scale from 0 (very unfair) to 10 (very fair) with
a standard deviation of 3.78. Coefficients were
precisely estimated and confidence intervals
were narrow.
Hypotheses Tests
The hypotheses were tested by comparing
predicted margins (see Table 2 for hypotheses
tests and Table 3 for regression results). H1
states that equal ownership is rated fairer than
unequal ownership. We found support for this
hypothesis. Having a joint account was rated
on average as 4.9 on the fairness scale, adjusted
for control. The level of fairness was rated
significantly lower when the wife owns more
(difference = 0.47, p< .001) and when the hus-
band owns more (difference = 0.14, p< .001),
adjusted for control. Thus, joint ownership was
rated less than one fairness point fairer than
unequal ownership.
H2 states that equal control is rated fairer than
unequal control. We also found support for this
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Table 2. Hypotheses Tests with Predictive Margins
Hypothesis Difference Test statistic
H1 Joint account (4.90) – W owns (4.43) 0.47***
Joint account (4.90) – H owns (4.76) 0.33***
H2 Equal control (7.89) – W controls (3.09) 4.79***
Equal control (7.89) – H controls (2.12) 5.77***
H3 Equal control vs. W controls (4.79) – Joint account vs. W owns (0.47) 4.32***
Equal control vs. H controls (5.77) – Joint account vs. H owns (0.33) 5.44***
H4 W owns & Equal control (7.08) – W owns & H controls (1.84) 5.25***
W owns & Equal control (7.08) – W owns & W controls (3.48) 3.60***
H owns & Equal control (7.03) – H owns & W controls (3.22) 3.81***
H owns & Equal control (7.03) – H owns & H controls (3.29) 3.74***
H5 W owns & W controls (3.48) – W owns & H controls (1.84) 1.65***
H owns & H controls (3.29) – H owns & W controls (3.22) 0.07
H6 H owns (4.76) – W owns (4.43) 0.33***
H7 W controls (3.09) – H controls (2.12) 0.98***
Notes. N = 19,648 vignette evaluations. The table shows F-tests of differences between predictive margins presented in
Figure 2 and Table S3. Predictive margins in parentheses. H = husband; W = wife.
*p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.
Table 3. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All Female Male Difference
Variable B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) Female − Male
Wife owns more −2.05*** (0.06) −2.04*** (0.09) −2.05*** (0.09) n.s.
Husband owns more −2.10*** (0.07) −2.05*** (0.10) −2.15*** (0.10) n.s.
Wife controls −6.42*** (0.07) −6.53*** (0.09) −6.30*** (0.10) n.s.
Husband controls −7.67*** (0.06) −8.02*** (0.08) −7.33*** (0.09) ***
Wife owns more × Wife controls 2.82*** (0.11) 2.82*** (0.16) 2.81*** (0.16) n.s.
Wife owns more × Husband controls 2.42*** (0.08) 2.49*** (0.11) 2.36*** (0.11) n.s.
Husband owns more × Wife controls 2.60*** (0.08) 2.61*** (0.12) 2.59*** (0.12) n.s.
Husband owns more × Husband controls 3.93*** (0.10) 4.04*** (0.14) 3.83*** (0.15) n.s.
Constant 9.13*** (0.03) 9.17*** (0.04) 9.09*** (0.04)
N 19,648 9,950 9,698
AIC 91,781 46,302 45,435
Note. Reference categories: equal control; joint account. n.s. = not significant.
*p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.
hypothesis. Figure 2 clearly shows that equal
control was rated fairer than unequal control.
Having equal control was rated on average as
7.89 on the fairness scale, adjusted for owner-
ship. The level of fairness was rated significantly
lower when the wife controls (difference = 4.79,
p< .001) and when the husband controls (differ-
ence = 5.77, p< .001), adjusted for ownership.
Thus, equal control was rated roughly 5 to 6 fair-
ness points fairer than unequal control.
H3 states that the control dimension is more
important for fairness evaluations than the
ownership dimension. We found support for
this hypothesis. We tested H3 by examining the
differences between the main effects of owner-
ship and the main effects of control. Thus, we
tested if the coefficients belonging to the con-
trol dimension are significantly larger than the
coefficients belonging to the ownership dimen-
sion. A joint F-test indicated that the effects of
unequal control in favor of the wife or in favor of
the husband are larger than the effects of unequal
ownership in favor of the wife or in favor of the
husband (F[2, 3,947] = 3,542.88, p< .001).
H4 states that unequal ownership is rated
fairer if control is equally distributed compared
to unequal control. In other words, equal control
can compensate unequal ownership. We found
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support for this hypothesis. Figure 2 clearly
shows that unequal ownership (both in favor of
the wife and the husband) was rated fairer if con-
trol is equally distributed. A joint F-test indi-
cated that the differences between equal control
and unequal control (both in favor of the wife
and the husband) for both unequal ownership
categories were significantly different from zero
(F[4, 3,947] = 1,539.61, p< .001).
H5 states that the one who owns more should
also control the savings, thus, testing the equity
principle. We found conflicting support for this
hypothesis. When the wife owns more than her
husband, respondents indicated it is fairer if she
also controls the savings compared to her hus-
band controlling (difference = 1.65, p< .001).
But when we the husband owns more than the
wife, we did not find a significant difference
in fairness evaluation between husband controls
and wife controls (difference = 0.07, p = .196).
With hypotheses H6 and H7 we tested the
entitlement principle. H6 states that respondents
believe in husband’s entitlement to own more
savings than the wife. We found support for this
hypothesis. Adjusted for control, respondents
evaluated unequal ownership in favor of the hus-
band fairer than unequal ownership in favor of
the wife. However, the difference was substan-
tially very small (difference = 0.33, p< .001).
Last, H7 states that respondents believe in
husband’s entitlement to control more sav-
ings than the wife. We found no support for
this hypothesis. Rather, results indicated that
adjusted for ownership, respondents evaluated
unequal control in favor of the wife fairer than
unequal control in favor of the husband (squares
below circles in Figure 2). Here, the difference
between her controlling and him controlling
(adjusted for ownership) was significant and
close to 1 fairness point (difference = 0.98,
p< .001). This result indicated that respon-
dents believed rather in wives’ entitlement to
control.
Gender Differences
Female respondents differed little from male
respondents in their fairness evaluations.
Table 3 shows regressions results separately
for female and male respondents. We conducted
two separate regressions and tested all seven
hypotheses in each subsample. There was only
one difference in the hypotheses tests. For the
male sample, we found support for the equity
principle (H5), but for the female sample we did
not find support. Male respondents indicated
that if the wife owns more than her husband
it is fairer if she controls the savings than he
controlling (1.48, p< .001) and if the husband
owns more it is fairer if he controls instead of
her (0.21, p< .01). Female respondents also
indicated that if the wife owns more than her
husband it is fairer if she controls compared to
him controlling (1.82, p< .001). However, in the
female subsample we did not find a significant
difference in fairness evaluation between hus-
band controls and wife controls when unequal
ownership is in favor of the husband (−0.06,
p = .475), just like in the total sample. This
suggested that men in contrast to women were
more likely to apply the equity principle.
We further checked if this finding is caused
by the fact that empirically men on average own
more financial savings than their partner. That
is, men may be more likely to apply the equity
principle because empirically their financial
contribution to the household may be greater
(Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983). Considering only
respondents who live together with their part-
ners and controlling for respondent’s actual
within-couple wealth distribution (respondent
owns more, respondent’s partner owns more, and
respondent owns as much as respondent’s part-
ner) interacted with the vignette dimensions, we
no longer found evidence that male respondents
apply the equity principle (p = .133, detailed
results available upon request). Further, we
found evidence for the equity principle only for
respondents who own more savings than their
partner (p = .000, detailed results available upon
request). For respondents who own less or equal
savings compared to their partner, we found no
evidence for the equity principle. Thus, it seems
that gender differences in the equity principle
can be explained by respondents’ characteristics
such as their own financial contributions.
Supplementary Analyses
With supplementary analyses we tested the
robustness of the findings and the validity of
the survey experiment. In the following, we
discuss (a) if the sample indeed constitutes a
valid random experiment, and if (b) satisfic-
ing by respondents (i.e., respondents attempt
to minimize cognitive effort), (c) specifica-
tions, and (d) the order of vignettes biased the
results.
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Figure 3. Robustness Checks: Satisficing.
Note. Regression coefficients are shown. N = 19,648 vignette evaluations (Main model), N = 19,163 (Unequal evaluations),
N = 18,354 (Not difficult), N = 19,370 (Rated 5 vignettes). 95% confidence intervals.
Independence between vignette dimensions
and respondents’ characteristics. For a valid
experiment, vignettes must be randomly
assigned to respondents. Thus, vignette dimen-
sions should be uncorrelated with respondents’
characteristics. Respondents were randomly
assigned to the experimental groups. Due to
nonresponse, however, vignette dimensions
might be correlated with respondents’ char-
acteristics in the final sample. That is, some
respondent’s characteristics might lead to
nonresponse on specific vignette evaluations.
To check if vignette dimensions are uncor-
related with unobserved characteristics, we
compared coefficients of a random effects and
a fixed effects model (Auspurg et al., 2017). A
cluster-robust version of Hausman’s specifica-
tion test, which allows for potential correlation
in the errors within respondents, indicated
that the coefficients do not differ significantly
(𝜒2[8] = 9.57, p = .30, rhausman ado in Stata;
Kaiser, 2015), suggesting that the vignette
dimensions are uncorrelated with unobserved
respondents’ characteristics.
Satisficing. Another threat to validity is satis-
ficing, that is, respondents attempt to minimize
their cognitive effort (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, &
Davidenko, 2009). For example, respondents
did not read the different vignettes or did not
think about the vignettes before evaluating the
fairness. Vignette evaluations would then not
reflect respondents’ true opinion, increasing
noise and decreasing validity. Hints for satis-
ficing behavior are that respondents (a) do not
rate all five vignettes, (b) rate all five vignettes
equally, and (c) indicate that they find the task
of evaluating the vignettes difficult. Excluding
respondents, (a) who did not evaluate all five
vignettes (N = 19,370 remaining observations),
(b) who indicated the same fairness evaluation
in all five vignettes (N = 19,163 remaining
observations), or (c) who indicated that the
task was difficult or very difficult (N = 18,354
remaining observations), did not change the
results. For the latter, after the vignette evalu-
ations, respondents were asked how difficult it
was to rate the vignettes. Figure 3 shows that
in all three additional models there are hardly
differences to the main model, suggesting that
there was no issue of fatigue or satisficing in
the sample. However, we cannot completely
rule out that respondents might have minimized
their cognitive effort by answering according to
social desirability rather than their true opinions,
a problem which is inevitable in most studies of
attitudes.
Model specifications. To test if model specifi-
cations affect the findings, we replicated the
main model (OLS with cluster robust standard
errors) using a multilevel model, which did not
lead to a change in the coefficients or standard
errors (see Figure 4). To check if the unbalanced
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Figure 4. Robustness Checks: Model specification.
Note. Regression coefficients are shown. N = 19,648 vignette evaluations (Main model, Multi-Level, Ordered probit),
N = 17,643 (Balanced sample). 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 5. Robustness Checks: Order Effects.
Note: Regression coefficients are shown. N = 19,648 vignette evaluations (Main model), N = 9,836 (Groups 1 and 2),
N = 9,812 (Groups 3 and 4), N = 11,795 (First three vignettes). 95% confidence intervals.
vignettes (oversample of anchoring vignette)
affected results, we randomly split the sample in
half, using the anchoring vignette only for half
of the sample to reach level balance. Figure 4
shows that the coefficients did not change much.
As the vignette evaluations might not be lin-
ear, that is, the differences between two fairness
points may not be equal across the whole range,
we performed an ordered probit regression as
a sensitivity analysis. Figure 4 shows that all
coefficients were significant in the same direc-
tion as in the main model.
Order effects. Last, we checked if the order of
the vignettes affects fairness evaluation. Indeed,
we found evidence for this phenomenon.
Because we split the sample in four experi-
mental groups, with two groups each having
the same set of vignettes but in reverse order,
we could perform separate regressions with
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each of the two experimental groups. Figure 5
indicates that the coefficients changed slightly
in comparison to the main model. We run the
additional hypotheses test in the same manner
as before (see Table 2) and found differences to
the main model only regarding H5 and H6. First,
in the subsample with experimental groups 1
and 2 we found support for the equity principle
(H5) (p = .047). Second, in the subsample with
experimental groups 3 and 4 we did not find
support for men’s entitlement to own more
savings (p = .090).
Another test for order effects is to include
only the first three vignettes per respondents. By
doing this, the dataset again included all vignette
dimensions as each deck is reversely ordered
once. The results of the hypotheses tests changed
only regarding one hypothesis compared to the
main model. We no longer found support for
H1 (equal ownership is rated fairer than unequal
ownership). In fact, in this subsample on average
respondents rated unequal ownership in favor of
the husband about 0.14 fairness points fairer than
equal ownership (p = .01). As respondents were
randomly assigned to experimental groups, the
results indicated that the order of the vignette
matters for fairness evaluations. We rely on the
analyses with the full sample because using all
four experimental groups and all vignette evalu-
ations will partly neutralize order effects.
Discussion
This study has examined fairness perceptions
of experimentally manipulated savings arrange-
ments in couples, that is, the distribution of
ownership of and control over savings between
partners. With a nationally representative facto-
rial survey experiment in Germany, we tested
competing norms about individual ownership
rights and autonomy (equity principle) and mar-
ital sharing (equality principle) in interaction
with gender ideology (entitlement principle).
Respondents were asked to rate the fairness of
hypothetical savings arrangements in couples
with random inequality in ownership of and con-
trol over savings.
By examining the perceived fairness of
married couples’ saving arrangements, we con-
tribute to the literatures on justice principles
and money in marriage. With our method-
ological approach we overcome the empirical
confoundedness between individual’s charac-
teristics such as gender and ownership of as
well as control over money, which is a central
limitation of observational studies. Further, we
quantitatively tested hypotheses derived from
non-representative qualitative research (e.g.,
Elizabeth, 2001; Evertsson & Nyman, 2014).
Last, we explicitly tested justice principles and
focused on savings rather than income, comple-
menting prior experimental research on money
in couples (e.g., Pepin, 2019).
Our major aim was to identify justice prin-
ciples in marriage, in particular regarding the
distribution of savings. To this end, we first
examined if individuals apply the equity and
equality principle when evaluating the fairness
of couples’ savings arrangements and asked if
equity and equality are two equally relevant jus-
tice principles in marriage. We found support
for the equality principle, especially when look-
ing at the control dimension. This is in line
with prior experimental research studying jus-
tice principles in couples in different countries
(Auspurg et al., 2017; Burgoyne & Routh, 2001;
Pepin, 2019).
In contrast, we did not find convincing
evidence for the equity principle (H5). This
finding conflicts with a study by Pepin (2019),
who showed that respondents in the United
States endorse the primary earner maintaining a
greater amount of the total household income.
It also conflicts with qualitative research in
the United Kingdom concluding that patterns
of personal spending money are dominantly
based on equity (Burgoyne & Lewis, 1994). In
contrast to prior studies, we examined savings
instead of earnings and control instead of money
management. Earnings can be clearly ascribed
to individuals whereas savings are more diffuse
because savings are stocks rather than flows. If
a couple owns a joint savings account and both
spouses irregularly put some money into this
account, the spouses may not know how much
money each spouse has contributed to the joint
savings. Therefore, earnings might carry more
than the ownership of savings implicit rights to
control. Because money management is a rather
executive task, it is less strongly linked to power
than control (Vogler et al., 2008). Therefore,
equality in control might also be subjectively
more important than equality in money manage-
ment. In addition, we looked at a country with a
rather high prevalence of traditional gender ide-
ology. Therefore, it might be that marital sharing
and the equality principle is more established
in Germany than in other countries. Further,
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respondents in Germany might not perceive
ownership of savings as relevant because the
default German marital property regime of
accrued gains provides financial security in the
event of divorce. However, redistribution of
property exists in many other contexts including
the United States. All in all, our study suggests
that marital sharing and the idea of equality
trump equity considerations when looking at
control and ownership of savings at least in
Germany.
Regarding gender differences, we found
support for the equity principle only for male
respondents. However, after controlling for
respondents’ actual within-couple distribution
of savings, we found no evidence for the equity
principle for female or male respondents. Thus,
gender differences in justice principles seem
to be explained by respondents’ characteris-
tics such as their financial contributions to the
household, which should be further examined in
future research.
To examine if entitlement is another impor-
tant justice principle in marriage, we tested if
gender is a characteristic according to which
resources should be distributed in marriage. We
found evidence for the entitlement principle, but
not in the expected direction. Based on tradi-
tional gender ideology we expected respondents
to believe in men’s entitlement to own more sav-
ings and to control them. Although our results
comply with beliefs in men’s entitlement to
own, they also suggest that respondents believe
in wives’ entitlement to control savings. This
result might be interpreted as beliefs in greater
support for women’s economic autonomy. This
interpretation would be in line with findings
of Pepin’s (2019) experimental vignette study
in the United States, in which respondents
were asked to allocate the income of hypothet-
ical couples between their individual accounts
and a shared account. She showed that when
women were presented as the primary earners,
respondents put more money on their personal
accounts than when men were presented as
the primary earners. Pepin (2019) argues that
the male breadwinner norm might suppress
support for men’s economic autonomy but not
women’s.
However, our evidence for beliefs in women’s
entitlement to control savings may also be
explained by expectations about gender-specific
behavior independent of traditional gender
ideology. Respondents might have assumed that
the hypothetical wife but not the hypothetical
husband would spent savings rather on goods
benefiting both partners than on goods benefiting
only one partner (Blumberg, 1988; Lundberg,
Pollak, & Wales, 1997). Another explanation
of the finding could be measurement error.
Respondents might have misunderstood our
measure of control as money management,
which was traditionally the wife’s role (Vogler
et al., 2008). However, in our qualitative pilot
we did not find hints that participants thought
about management rather than control. Impor-
tantly, inequality in favor of the husband was
rated differently than inequality in favor of the
wife. Thus, unlike in the allocation of house-
work (Auspurg et al., 2017), when distributing
money individuals seem to differentiate on the
basis of gender, indicating that beliefs about
money in marriage and fairness perceptions of
inequality are gendered. Although savings are
more common and therefore may play a more
important role in German marriages compared
to other countries, based on Pepin’s (2019)
findings regarding beliefs in women’s economic
autonomy our findings may be generalizable to
other countries.
Last, we examined how individuals would
like to establish equality and what marital shar-
ing comprises. Our results suggest that the norm
of marital sharing is widespread but is rather
fulfilled by equal control than by equal owner-
ship. We found that equal control is more impor-
tant for fairness than equal ownership. We fur-
ther showed that unequal ownership is judged
fairer if both partners control the savings than
if only one partner controls the savings. This is
evidence for respondents’ beliefs that unequal
ownership can be compensated by equal con-
trol. Respondents seem to believe that auton-
omy and sharing can be reconciled by hav-
ing separate savings accounts but equal con-
trol. Whereas separate saving accounts guaran-
tee long-term autonomy in access, having equal
control realizes the norm of sharing. Because
prior qualitative research shows that couples in
different countries try to reconcile the competing
norms of autonomy and sharing (Evertsson &
Nyman, 2014; Pepin, 2019), this finding may be
generalizable to other contexts. However, com-
parative research is needed to understand how
individuals’ beliefs about sharing in couples are
shaped by national contexts.
Our findings should be interpreted in light of
its limitations. One limitation of this study is
Beliefs about Distributive Justice in Marriage 531
that results are only transferable to the German
general population’s beliefs about the fairness
of savings arrangements in married, childless,
full-time working, and housework-sharing cou-
ples because we kept those characteristics con-
stant in the vignettes. Important complements
for future research would be to experimentally
manipulate marital and parental status but also
to examine other financial arrangements (income
or other wealth components). Further, it would
be interesting to look at justice principles in the
context of divorce.
Another limitation is that we cannot com-
pletely rule out the possibility of order effects.
We showed that the order of vignettes affects
fairness evaluations. However, as we reversed
the order of the vignettes within the two decks
once to have four experimental groups, we at
least reduced order effects when using the whole
sample. Within the GESIS Panel it is only pos-
sible to use up to four experimental groups. An
important methodological take-home message
of this study is to always randomize the order
of vignettes.
Last, the study is theoretically limited in
neglecting access to and management of sav-
ings. By studying control over savings (i.e., final
say over major financial decisions), we neglect
access to savings for smaller purposes. Eliza-
beth (2001) cautions that if access to income
is neglected, inequalities in personal spending
power may emerge although control is shared.
Although the difference between access to and
control over savings might not be as severe as
the difference between access to and control over
income, access to savings is arguably another
important factor affecting (financial) well-being.
One could conclude that wealth inequalities
can be compensated by sharing equal control.
Because control is shared in most German cou-
ples (Lott, 2009), the substantial within-couple
wealth inequalities identified in prior studies
(Grabka et al., 2015) might not be perceived as
subjectively relevant by those affected. How-
ever, if equality is established by having equal
control, hidden inequality through unequal
access may be in place (Elizabeth, 2001). The
acceptance of unequal ownership if control
is shared, thus, involves the risk that inequal-
ities in accessing savings still emerge due
to beliefs in individual ownerships rights
and equity considerations, affecting personal
spending power and the (financial) well-being of
individuals.
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